"In this regard, please extend assistance to our survey team who will be conducting the survey proper among the officers of your command."
The survey questions follow in the next couple of pages, printed on long bond paper, to be answered by ticking off one of the boxes, Strongly Agree, Agree, Unsure, Disagree, Strongly Disagree. The questions themselves, independently of how they are answered, are vastly revealing of the concerns, or fears, of the top brass and deserve to be laid out in full. They are:
"1. In the May 2007 elections, it is possible that many personnel, active or retired, have also supported the candidacy of ex-Lt. Trillanes. 2. Voters have cast their votes for Trillanes to openly express their disappointment with the present national leadership. 3. The votes cast in favor of ex-Lt. Trillanes reflect the people's trust in his competence for good governance. 4. Within the military organization, a Trillanes vote indicates a compelling desire for change in the military/defense establishment. 5. Within the AFP, a Trillanes vote implies defiance of the AFP top brass.
"6. I perceive ex-Lt. Trillanes, who is a military man, to have limited knowledge of governance. 7. Trillanes is successful in his senatorial bid because of the public's dissatisfaction with the military/defense leadership. 8. Ex-Lt. Antonio Trillanes definitely provides strong leadership. 9. Many have supported Trillanes' candidacy because he represents reform in the Armed Forces. 10. The concerns of the soldiers will be better represented when Trillanes becomes senator.
"11. Ex-Lt. Trillanes should be released on bail by the time he sits as senator. 12. Ex-Lt. Trillanes should have waited for the conclusion of the charges against him before running for public office. 13. Coming from the military organization, ex-Lt. Trillanes can bring forth significant changes for the AFP should he get elected. 14. Ex-Lt. Trillanes wants to be in power so he cannot be made accountable for his fault in the Oakwood event. 15. I believe that ex-Lt. Trillanes is supported by politicians who want a divided AFP.
"16. The votes that ex-Lt. Trillanes got are expressions of the public's diminished confidence in the military organization. 17. The support that Trillanes got represents a silent approval that agrees with extra-constitutional resort to achieve organizational change. 18. If this country requires radical alternatives such as ... a coup d'etat to achieve reforms, then so be it. 19. Voluntarily, ex-Lt. Trillanes could have forged an alliance with the Left for his senatorial candidacy. 20. Left-leaning groups have supported Trillanes because they saw in him a rallying point to promote their cause."
Of course I'd like nothing better than to know the results of this survey. But quite apart from that, the survey by itself already says the most curious things about the state of this country's armed forces today. It's enough to make you think that Trillanes' success in this election quite possibly qualifies as its most important aspect. It has the most far-reaching consequences of all, not just for the future of the military but for the future of the country as well.
At the very least, as someone pointed out to me, what this survey suggests is that, contrary to Hermogenes Esperon and company's earlier press release that they would not mess around with the election but would keep the military neutral, they have messed around with it and tried to make the military partisan. Not the least by throwing all sorts of obstacles in one candidate Trillanes' path.
Someone told me that what happened was that the top brass guaranteed Malacañang a command vote of 50,000, ordering the rank-and-file to register en masse and vote for the administration ticket. Alas—for them—the rank-and-file did register but voted opposition. Indeed, they voted for the one person they had been told not to, making Trillanes their No. 1 choice. But even if you take that story with a grain of salt, the survey by itself is proof of the utter astonishment, if not profound chagrin, of those who tried to make sure their worst nightmare would not happen. You would not make that survey if things went well within your range of expectations.
Will it show the true sentiment of the armed forces?
Somebody told me that he worried many respondents might not answer truthfully given that the survey also asked them to identify their rank, branch and assignment, which would pretty much identify them. For all they know, this could be a ploy to ferret out the malcontents, or their leaders.
I myself suspect the people who made this survey are primarily intent on getting a true picture of the sentiment of the rank-and-file. Its whole tenor suggests a desperation to know so. It gives you a sense of people who have been unnerved by violently thwarted expectations and who have begun to wonder if they are basing their judgment on the wrong premises. It is a demand to know what happened. It is a demand to know what is happening.
It is a need to know if they are still in control. (To be concluded)
THERE’S THE RUB
How do you solve a problem like Trillanes?
By Conrado de Quiros
InquirerLast updated 01:16am (Mla time) 06/12/2007
(Conclusion)
At the very least, the questions themselves reveal the kind of bind government finds itself in.
Item No. 11 specifically shows so. “Ex-Lt. Trillanes should be released on bail by the time he sits as senator.” What’s unusual about that question is that, officially at least, whatever the rank and file thinks of it should really be of no consequence. Whether Trillanes should be released on bail or not to serve his duties as senator is not a matter for the barracks to decide. It is a matter for the courts to decide.
Unofficially, that question is vital in the extreme -- and shows not quite incidentally how law in this country, far from being the sternly benign and the impassively objective presence it is trotted out to be, is the timidly opportunistic and politically malleable apparition it is. The fate of Trillanes does not hang on the intrinsic merits of his case, it hangs on the extrinsic perception of it. Especially of the people who hold the guns. Whether Trillanes should be allowed to serve as senator in the halls of the Senate or in his detention cell depends vitally on how the rank and file feels about it. The current leadership cannot afford to piss off the people with the guns.
No. 12 is closely related to it. “Trillanes should have waited for the conclusion of the charges against him before running for public office.” Like the previous question, officially at least that one solicits answers from soldiers that are irrelevant or inconsequential. Unofficially, and pragmatically, the answers to that are decisive to his case. It is not just Trillanes’ liberty while serving as senator that is at stake here, it is his future as a free man or a continuing convict.
The real question, in fact, the one that lurks beneath is: Should Trillanes be recognized as a senator or not? Government’s predilection is to not do so, or at least to have that as a last resort. The cue there is Lawrence San Juan, one of the accused in the Oakwood mutiny, suddenly changing his plea from innocent to guilty. A thing that bowled over his lawyers, Teddy Te and Rene Saguisag, who could not for the life of them comprehend why a man who stood a very good chance of being acquitted would masochistically insist on being jailed for a crime. By doing so, of course, he is dragging down with him his co-accused, chief of them Trillanes.
Whether that tack will prosper or not does not depend on legal implacability, it depends on public outrage. The outrage above all of the soldiers themselves.
The other questions merely try to gauge the rank and file’s perception of what the public already knows, or intuits. If the respondents answer the questions without fear or trepidation, we are probably going to see them ticking off “Strongly Agree” to many of them.
Most citizens certainly will. Yes, many personnel, active or retired, supported the candidacy of Trillanes -- they were his bulwark. Yes, voters voted for Trillanes to express their disappointment with the present national leadership -- more Trillanes in that respect than the other opposition candidates. Yes, a Trillanes vote indicates a compelling desire for change within the military establishment -- votes are easier to cast than coups. Yes, within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, a Trillanes vote implies defiance of the top brass -- how else construe it, they were told not to and they did?
Yes, Trillanes is successful because of the public’s dissatisfaction with the military/defense leadership -- Trillanes was a referendum on changing that leadership along with the civilian one. Yes, Trillanes represents a strong leadership -- the strength isn’t just physical, he has endured prison for four years and continues to hold fast to his principles. Yes, Trillanes’ votes are expressions of the public’s diminished confidence in the military organization -- and increased trust in those who are being punished for trying to make it better.
I don’t know how the soldiers will answer the last few questions, given that they have been formulated baldly. The votes that Trillanes got represent a tacit endorsement of “extra-constitutional resort to change”? If the country requires radical alternatives to achieve reforms, such as a coup, so be it? I don’t know that most soldiers, quite apart from citizens, will say yes.
But change the wording into “tacit endorsement of extra-constitutional action against this regime” and “radical alternatives to change this regime, such as by coups,” and the equation changes completely. If truthfully answered, we could see a lot of yeses there. An extra-constitutional action against an extra-constitutional regime, or a coup against a coup regime -- this is a regime that is hounded by legitimacy problems -- has a way of canceling things out. Lest we forget, the officers and men, not least of the Marines, are still smarting from having been used to cheat in the South and seeing those who tried to stop it court-martialed.
The survey is a neon sign pointing to truly interesting times. Its longer-lasting implication is not to the future of coups, it is to the future of any action by the current rulers to retain power by hook or by crook, by law or by force. I do still think that is their natural trajectory: They cannot afford to lose power as they stand to reap the whirlwind afterward. The question now is how to. Ferdinand Marcos at least had all the generals of the various commands with him, save Rocky Ileto, when he decided to plunge this country into political darkness. The current leadership, civilian and military, can’t even count on their own to plunge someone they have decreed as pariah into electoral oblivion. Right now, they are only busy singing the refrain:
How do you solve a problem like Trillanes?